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NEW FROM ROUTLEDGE 2026

'Capital' as Literature: Marx Against Himself



’CAPITAL’ AS LITERATURE: MARX AGAINST HIMSELF



Studies of Marx, particularly of his masterwork Capital (1867), are as a rule tutelary—they attempt to explain him. Even literary readers of Marx, from Raymond Williams to Fredric Jameson, seek to secure Marxist tenets by means of Marxian style. ‘Capital’ as Literature: Marx Against Himself departs from this tradition by reading Capital as literary in its own right rather than as political economy with style as its filigree rather than its focus. Here, Marx emerges in a different light. If literature is writing that calls whatever is settled into question, then Marx's writing is literature, not because of its revolutionary program, but because Marx's rhetoric, particularly its key trope of chiasmus, undoes the coherence of the notions it propounds, especially in Capital. Marx's chiasmatic style turns Capital into a mise en abyme and Marx's enterprise into an example of what it describes rather than its foil or antidote: the structure of capital itself. Capital, like capital, is a self-begetting production machine whose fungibility as a form is one and the same with the money economy it unravels. ‘Capital’ as Literature: Marx Against Himself shows how this irony unfolds and what the implications are for epistemology, cultural studies, and literary criticism.




ALSO FROM ROUTLEDGE 2022

Criticism After Theory from Shakespeare to Virginia Woolf



CRITICISM AFTER THEORY FROM SHAKESPEARE TO VIRIGINIA WOOLF

The argument of this book is a simple one: that criticism after theory is a single movement of thought defined by synthesis and continuity rather than by conflict and change. The most influential figures in criticism since Saussure—Bakhtin, Derrida, and Foucault—are wholly consistent with Saussure's foundational Course in General Linguistics (1916) no matter the traditions of complaint that have followed in Saussure's wake from Bakhtin forward. These complaints vitiate—despite themselves and often hilariously so—the misconceptions that have made cottage industries out of quarrels with Saussurean semiology that are based on notions of Saussure that are incorrect. The materialist criticism dominant today is actually dependent upon on the legacy of a presumably formalist structuralism rather than a step beyond it. New Historicism, postcolonialism, gender studies, environmental criticism, archive studies, even shared and surface reading are, like deconstruction, the by-products of Saussure's structuralism, not its foils. Saussure's sign is sensory and concrete. Language and materiality are not distinct but one and the same—history, society, the psychological subject, even the environment are systems of signs, material archives read and reread by futures that produce the past after the fact. Without Saussure, contemporary criticism would have no identifiable or effective source. The book begins with chapters on Saussure and Derrida, Bakhtin and Shakespeare, and Freud and Foucault followed by chapters on Victorian and American fiction, D.H. Lawrence and modern poetry, Virginia Woolf and Melanie Klein, and the historicist tropology of psychoanalysis. It concludes with a coda in life writing on the author's epileptic disability.




Portuguese translation of THE MYTH OF POPULAR CULTURE (Blackwell Manifestos, 2010) now available from Tinta Negra (Rio de Janeiro, 2015)



OS MITOS DA CULTURA POP: DE DANTE A DYLAN


O renomado crítico cultural americano Perry Meisel detona as noções convencionais sobre a divisão entre “alta” e “baixa” cultura.

O autor transita pela provocante teoria de que a cultura pop experimentou ritmos dialéticos. A hábil análise que o livro apresenta de três tradições culturais duradouras – o romance norte-americano, Hollywood, e o rock inglês e americano – nos leva a um ciclo histórico da cultura pop que tem Dante como ponto de partida e revisita ícones como Wahrol, Melville, Hemingway, Twain, Eisenstein, Benjamin, Scorsese e Sinatra.




THE MYTH OF POPULAR CULTURE: FROM DANTE TO DYLAN


The Myth of Popular Culture discusses the dialectic of "highbrow" and "lowbrow" in popular culture through an examination of literature, film, and popular music. With topics ranging from John Keats to John Ford, the book responds to Adorno's theory that popular culture is not dialectical by showing that it is.

Available as eBooks

COURSE IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS. Trans. Wade Baskin. Co-ed. with Haun Saussy. By Ferdinand de Saussure (Columbia University Press, 2011)

THE MYTH OF POPULAR CULTURE: FROM DANTE TO DYLAN
(
Blackwell Manifestos, 2010)

THE LITERARY FREUD (Routledge, 2007)

THE COWBOY AND THE DANDY: CROSSING OVER FROM ROMANTICISM TO ROCK AND ROLL (Oxford University Press, 1998)

FREUD: A COLLECTION OF CRITICAL ESSAYS (Prentice-Hall, 1981)




8/16/10

Village Voice 'Pazz & Jop Product Report' 1976 - 1977


"Each critic votes for between zero and 10 'yea' records per month and awards each one 10 (masterpiece), 8, 7 (recommended purchase), 5 (borderline), 3, 2, or 1 (shades of listenable) votes."

Perry Meisel's votes:

October 18, 1976:

The Beatles: 'Rock n' Roll music' (Capitol) 10; 'Kenny Burrell/John Coltrane' (Prestige) 10; George Benson: 'Breezin' ' (Warner Bros.) 8; Gene Ammons: 'The Gene Ammons Story: The 78 Era ' (Prestige) 8; Boz Scaggs: 'Silk Degrees' (Columbia) 8; Wardell Gray: 'Central Avenue' (Prestige) 8; Steve Miller: 'Fly Like an Eagle' (Capitol) 7; The Crusaders: 'Chain Reaction' (ABC/Blue Thumb) 3; 'L.A. Express': (Caribou) 2; Lee Ritenour: 'First Course' (Epic) 1.

November 22, 1976:

YEA: Johnny Griffin and Eddie "Lockjaw" Davis: 'The Toughest Tenors' 7; 'Stuff' 5; Bryan Ferry: 'Let's Stick Together' 5; Sonny Fortune: 'Waves of Dreams' 5; Eric Clapton: 'No Reason to Cry' 5; Steely Dan: 'The Royal Scam' 5; Jim Hall: Commitment 3; Ted Nugent: 'Free-for-All' 2; Sir Doug - The Texas Tornadoes; 'Texas Rock for Country Rollers' 2; Orleans: 'Walking and Dreaming' 1.
NAY: John Lucien: 'Premonition' -3.

December 20, 1976:

YEA: Dave Mason: 'Certified Live' 7; J.J. Cale: 'Troubadour' 7; Graham Parker & the Rumour: 'Heat Treatment' 5; 'Billy Preston' 5; Frank Zappa: 'Zoot Allures' 3; Kinky Friedman: 'Lasso from El Paso' 2; George Harrison: 'Thirty-Three & 1/3' 2; Elvin Bishop: 'Hometown Boy Makes Good!' 2.
NAY: 'The Best of the Pointer Sisters' - 3; Phoebe Snow: 'It Looks Like Snow' -1.

January 13, 1977:

YEA: 'The Lester Bangs Story, Volume 1' 10; Al Green: 'Have a Good Time' 8; George Benson: 'Benson Burner' 8; 'Wings over America' 5; Joni Mitchell: 'Hejira' 5; Joe Henderson: 'Black Narcissus' 3.

February 28, 1977:

YEA: Average White Band: 'Person to Person' 7; Andrew Gold: 'What's Wrong with This Picture?' 5; Rahsaan Roland Kirk: 'Kirkatron' 5; Santana: 'Festival' 5; The Eagles: 'Hotel California' 3; Steve Hillage: 'L' 3; Milton Nascimento: 'Milton' 2; Emmylou Harris: 'Luxury Liner' 1.
NAY: Queen: 'A Day at the Races' -2.

March 21, 1977:

YEA: 'Phil Spector's Greatest Hits' 10; Bob Seger & the Silver Bullet Band: 'Night Moves' 7; Ted Curson & Company: 'Jubilant Power' (Inner City) 7; Son Seals: 'Midnight Son' (Alligator) 7; Booker T & the M.G.s: 'Universal Language' 5; James Talley: 'Blackjack Choir' 5; 'Mel Lewis and Friends' 3; John Handy: 'Carnival' 2; Pousette-Dart Band: 'Amnesia' 1.

May 16, 1977:

YEA: 'The Yardbirds Greatest Hits' 8; Miles Davis: 'Water Babies' 7; Garland Jeffreys: 'Ghost Writer' 5; Kate & Anna McGarrigle: 'Dancer with Bruised Knees' 5; Roger McGuinn: 'Thunderbyrd' 5; Nils Lofgren: 'I Came to Dance' 3; Fleetwood Mac: 'Rumours' 3; Art Farmer: 'Crawl Space' 1.

June 6, 1977:

YEA: Dexter Gordon: 'Homecoming' (Columbia) 7; Bryan Ferry: 'In Your Mind' (Atlantic) 7; Jack Bruce: 'How's Tricks?' (RSO) 5; Herbie Hancock: 'V.S.O.P.' (Columbia) 5; The Beach Boys Love You' (Brother/Reprise) 5; Dave Mason: 'Let it Flow' (Columbia) 3; David Newman: 'Front Money' (Warner Bros.) 3; The Band: 'Islands' (Capitol) 3; Van Morrison: 'A Period of Transition' (Warner Bros.) 3; Asleep at the Wheel: 'The Wheel' (Capitol) 3; Bonnie Raitt: 'Sweet Forgivness' (Warner Bros.) 3.
NAY: Southside Johnny and the Asbury Jukes: 'This Time It's For Real' (Epic) -1.

July 4, 1977:

YEA: 'The Beatles at the Hollywood Bowl' (Capitol) 10; The Beatles: 'Live at the Star Club' (Bellaphon) 10; Ornette Coleman: 'Dancing in Your Head' (Horizon) 5; Denny Laine: 'Holly Days' (Capitol) 5; Aretha Franklin: 'Sweet Passion' (Atlantic) 3; The Steve Miller Band: 'Book of Dreams' (Capitol) 3; 'Here at Last . . . Bee Gees . . . Live!' 3; Gary Bartz: 'Music is My Sanctuary' (Capitol) 2; Neil Sedaka: 'A Song' (Elektra) 1.

August 1, 1977:

YEA: 'Funk. Last of the Great Earl Hooker' (Antilles) 7; Ornette Coleman: 'Dancing in Your Head' (Horizon) 7; Roger McGuinn: 'Thunderbyrd' (Columbia) 5; 'Mink DeVille' (Capitol) 5; 'Steve Winwood' (Island) 3; Peter Tosh: 'Equal Rights' (Columbia) 3; David Sanborn Band: 'Promise Me the Moon' (Warner Bros.) 2; Glen Campbell: 'Southern Nights' (Capitol) 1.

September 5, 1977:

YEA: Joe Tax: 'Bumps & Bruises' (Epic) 7; Carole King: 'Simple Things' (Avatar) 7; The Meters: 'New Directions' (Warner Bros.) 7; Average White Band & Ben E. King: 'Benny and Us' (Atlantic) 5; Gells: 'Monkey Island' (Atlantic) 3; Coryell/Mouzon: 'Back Together Again' (Atlantic) 2.
NAY: Lee Ritenour: 'Captain Fingers' (Epic) -1.

October 3, 1977

YEA: 'Crawler' (Epic) 3; 'Topaz' (Columbia) 2; Target: 'Captured' (A&M) 2; Cheap Trick: 'In Color' (Epic) 2; Piper: 'Can't Wait' (A&M) 2; Rush: 'A Farewell to Kings' (Mercury) 1; Brush Arbor: 'Straight' (Monument) 1.

November 7, 1977

YEA: 'George Thorogood and the Destroyers' (Rounder) 7; Graham Parker and the Rumour: 'Stick to Me' (Mercury) 7; Jackie Lomax: Did You Ever Have That Feeling?' (Capitol) 5; Esther Phillips: 'You've Come a Long Way, Baby' (Mercury) 5; Rolling Stones: 'Love You Live' (Rolling Stones) 5; 'Talking Heads 77' (Sire) 5; 'Nona Hendryx' (Epic) 3; 'Libby Titus' (Columbia) 3; Freddie Hubbard: 'Bundle of Joy' (Columbia) 2.

December 5, 1977:

YEA: Charlie Parker and the All-Stars: 'Summit Meeting at Birdland' (Columbia) 10; Miles Davis and Tadd Dameron Quintet: 'The Paris Festival Internation' (Columbia) 10; Charlie Parker Quintet: 'One Night in Birdland' (Columbia) 8; Dexter Gordon: 'Sophisticated Giant' (Columbia) 7; Boz Scaggs: 'Down Two Then Left' (Columbia) 5; Robert Jr. Lockwood: 'Does 12' (Trix) 5; Merle Haggard: 'A Working Man Can't Get Nowhere Today' (Capitol) 5; James Talley: 'Ain't It Somethin'' (Capitol) 5; The Bar-Kays: 'Flying High on Your Love' (Mercury) 3.

8/9/10

Philip Roth's New Novel: Tender is the Knife

by Perry Meisel

Although many readers will want to accuse Philip Roth of repeating the same old complaints in his forthcoming novel, THE PROFESSOR OF DESIRE (Farrar, Straus, & Giroux, $8.95), what they will really be objecting to is the steady refinement of a narrative manner so unique in English that it ranks among the major achievements in the literature of our time.
Like Portnoy's Complaint (1969), and My Life as a Man (1974), The Professor of Desire is once again the story of a Jew shooting his mouth off in public. But what a mouth! Roth has hammered the rage of Portnoy and the pathos of My Life as a Man into a prose so compressed that it can sound discordant meanings in a single phrase without losing a beat in the flow of a story that is tender, tough, and riotously funny all at once. What is especially remarkable is that such dense and allusive language can masquerade so well as a simple transcription of living speech, allowing the Portnovian monologue the ironic privilege of looking far more innocent than it really is.
Roth's new speaker and hero, David Kepesh, is not so new - we have met him before in The Breast (1972), that slim Kafkaesque volume of considerable power despite the Rilke poem pinned to its tail. The Professor of Desire is Kepesh's life before his grotesque metamorphosis at the age of 38 into a gigantic mammary gland, although the new novel stops four years short of the transformation itself, merely alluding to its possibility with an oblique reference in the book's final paragraph. This is something rare in fiction, a novelist filling in early after late, and it sets up a strange kind of suspense in the story that keeps the reader wondering at what point in the inevitable line the new novel will stop short of the terminal events of The Breast.
Roth, however, leaves us with a Kepesh who at age 34 finds himself well within sight of the kind of domestic happiness that most Roth heroes can hardly even imagine. What gets in Kepesh's way is a kind of moral embarrassment about professing anything with total conviction, especially the love of a particular woman. He is trying his best to accept the fact that there is neither perfect happiness nor perfect companionship (as a Kafka scholar and professor of comparative literature, he should know better in the first place), although the price of such resignation may well be a permanent spiritual dyspepsia.
As a chronicler of contemporary manners, Roth knows no embarrassments as he pries into the secret fears and shames of which our personal security - and our universal frustration - is composed. Women are made to look unworthy, and men unworthier still, for failing to acknowledge a contempt for the opposite sex that is largely sexual in motivation. Here morality interferes with satisfaction in a shockingly new kind of way, and it is no small part of the book's despair that such a situation appears to be irredeemable.
Irredeemable or not, however, Kepesh has done his best to dig himself out of the rubble of an identity in ruins. Pouring white wine on the porch of the mountain cottage he shares with his "wholesome" lover Claire at the close of the novel, Kepesh can only feel thankful for his relative good fortune. He has, of course, suffered for the happiness that is now within his reach - a rapist's imagination, an agonizing divorce, a mother dead from cancer, a lonely father to look after - but at least he has come through in one piece.
At the book's close he even feels embarrassment for his petty miseries next to the real sufferings of his never-say-die father and his father's friend Mr. Barbatnik, a survivor of the concentration camps who joins the elder Kepesh for a Labor Day visit to his son and (almost) daughter-in-law in the remarkable sequence with which the novel concludes.
This looks like something new in Roth's fiction, a character who actually seems to learn as the book progresses. To his own astonishment, Kepesh finds himself capable of facing all kinds of horrors with a sometimes shocking equanimity, whether it is a visit from his ex-wife Helen (an occasional swinger whom Kepesh has once had to rescue from a Hong Kong jail, and who is now married to a dull goyische businessman whom she hates), or even his fear that his father will expire from a heart attack in his sleep.
Kepesh has apparently accomplished the life project he calls "Becoming Myself" by descending into the destructive element of his sexuality to such a point of self-abandon that he is able to confront Desire in all its immediacy. Unlike Alexander Portnoy's, however, Kepesh's self-absorption seems to produce at least a modicum of relief, perhaps because he has satisfied his urges somewhat more fully than Alex. His sexual buffoonery as a student at Syracuse ("I actually succeed in achieving full penetration on but two occasions") gives way to the wild satisfactions of his year in London as a "sexual prodigy" disguised as a Fulbright Fellow ("I actually did what the jerk-off artists dreamed about.") Here he meets Elisabeth and Birgitta, a pair of Swedish roommates with whom he engages in a devastating ménage à trois that sends the weaker Elisabeth back to her parents and leaves Kepesh and Birgitta to an even deeper exploration of their mutual lust for bondage and humiliation.
Contempt is a far safer emotion as a theatrical component of sexuality than as a basis for a permanent relationship. Kepesh however, eventually pursues it in marriage, binding himself to the narcissistic and philistine Helen, whose behavior consumes him with a fiery hate and disgust more appropriate - or at least less dangerous - in a casual sexual adventure than in the daily life of marriage. When the bond is broken, Kepesh is forced to drift again, his misery punctuated by a paranoid relationship with the wife of his department chairman and with the high-school brand of sexual misadventures in which he engages from time to time in the company of his department's poet-in-residence, the gross and gluttonous Ralph Baumgarten.
Having stared in the mirror screaming "I want somebody!" long enough, Kepesh eventually discovers Claire Ovington. Unlike Helen, the "imperturbable" Claire is constantly solicitous of Kepesh's well-being; whatever hints of masochistic submission there may be in her character - few enough, considering her refusal to swallow Kepesh's semen - are subdued under the names of good will and caring. So possible does Kepesh's future happiness seem by the time he and Claire spend their summer together in the mountains, that it looks like Roth has finally assigned a name and a face to the "faceless" Mrs. Portnoy, whom Alex fantasizes as his plane lands in Israel. Typically non-Jewish, Claire certainly seems to be the Right Girl - even Abe Kepesh develops an extreme fondness for her despite the living arrangement she has worked out with his son. Indeed, Roth even seems to want us to confuse Claire Ovington with Claire Bloom, the English actress to whom the new novel is dedicated.
Tempting as it may be to view this suggested identity as a serious sign of potential happiness for Roth and Kepesh alike, it constitutes precisely the kind of false lead that the novel delights in derailing. As Kapesh's long-time lover in The Breast, Claire Ovington seems to have entered Roth's life long before Claire Bloom, which can only suggest that Life imitates Art in an uncanny confirmation of one such interpretation that Kepesh assigns to his own metamorphosis in the earlier novel. Like the erection that Kepesh dangles in the faces of his various lovers, all the momentary certitude of both autobiographical fiction and a developmental plot turns out to be little more than an insulting piece of banality. (Roth has even exchanged the magisterial term "cock" for the humbler "member" throughout the novel.)
This, of course, is Roth's usual strategy, the gift that blows up in your face. Like the dictionary definition of "Portnoy's complaint" or the all-too-neat psychobiographical premises of My Life as a Man, both Kepesh's near-happiness and Roth's apparent identity with him are offered up like the drivel that spurts from the mouth of Roth's goyische "Answer Man" in a story published in 1970 ("On the Air"). Roth dismissed biographical interpretations of his work in the 1974 essay, "Imagining Jews" (reprinted in Reading Myself and Others, 1975), where he takes to task those reviewers who found Portnoy autobiographical. "A novel in the guise of a confession," he says, "was received and judged by any number of readers as a confession in the guise of a novel." That Kepesh's own happiness is also to be dismissed is, of course, already foreordained by the mere fact of The Breast.
Worst of all, however, is that Kepesh's grotesque transformation also happens to represent a kind of total satisfaction, since it means (among other things) that Kepesh, who does not subscribe to the wish-fulfillment interpretation of his metamorphosis, has become identical with the object of his desire. This is satisfaction with a stupefying vengeance, and its yield of profound unpleasure has been the pattern, as we can see now, of Kepesh's entire life. Although he may be a jerk-off artist's hero, the more he gets the worse he feels. ("No more more!" he groans.) Kepesh even has the misfortune to see some of his worst fears come true - not only Helen's return after their divorce but also the confirmation of his college friend Jellinek's treasonous homosexuality.
With these ironies constantly in the background, Kepesh's project of self-understanding - "Becoming Myself" - is everywhere subject to burlesque. As a professor and literary critic, he seeks the same kinds of revelations in books that he seeks in his private life, and much of Roth's wickedness lies in the way he offers up snatches of Kepesh's academic prose as samples of the kind of interpretation a reader might expect to bring to The Professor of Desire. Roth even has the audacity to make Professor Kepesh an anti-formalist in the classroom.
Enjoining his students never to use the words "structure," "form," or "symbol" in their papers, Kepesh warns them above all against an approach to fiction that some of his colleagues call "non-referential." What Kepesh wants is a highly grounded psychosexual and biographical style of literary analysis that will yield a central truth about life in books. What he gets is ridicule from the very author who has endowed him with existence. Roth has Kepesh writing two books simultaneously by the late portions of the novel, one of them virtually identical with The Professor of Desire - "my life in its most puzzling and maddening aspects" - the other a book on Kafka, which presumably interprets Kepesh's confessions, insofar as they are a palimpsest of Kafka's own texts, in a manner akin to the supposed interpretation Tarnopol's narrative performs on his own short stories in My Life as a Man. By the end of the novel, Kepesh even switches momentarily to the third person to summarize a Chekhov story that virtually completes and seals The Professor of Desire by doubling the novel's story line as part of the book's own plot.
Nor is Roth kidding when he makes academic jokes. There is some riotous sarcasm about particular kinds of criticism. Baumgarten, for example, expects any day to read "an article by some good old boy from Vanderbilt on hospitality in the Southern novel: "Make Yourself at Home: The Theme of Hospitality in Faulkner's "A Rose for Emily." " "But there is also a good deal of serious allusion. Kepesh is a seeker of Man in literature. His first book of criticism, Man in a Shell, looks, for example, like a blatant rejection of Conrad's celebrated theory - that meaning is not "within the shell" where someone like Kepesh imagines Man's "kernel" to reside. (Here one recalls the renaming of Kafka as "Kishka" in Roth's 1973 sketch - " "I Always Wanted You to Admire My Fasting": or, Looking at Kafka" - in which the writer becomes Roth's Hebrew-school teacher in 1942.) For Conrad's Marlow, this means trying to get rid of a belief in psychological cores or essences; for Roth's Kepesh, it means a constant search for an answer that does not exist. Despite the allusion - or perhaps because of it - Kepesh persists in looking for cores or kernels since he is bent on discovering a real and inherent meaning both to himself and his favorite literary texts.
All the references aside, Kepesh still wants a central illumination. With this end in mind, Roth presents us with Kepesh's hilarious dream of Kafka's whore the night he sleeps in Prague after visiting Kafka's tomb with Claire. It is, of course, a dream of revelation through sexual discovery, although when Kepesh interrogates the whore, now nearly 80, he fears she is confusing Kafka with all the other "nice Jewish boys" who came to her with their "clean underwear."
Kepesh's questions to the whore are predictable enough: "Was [Kafka] regularly able to have an erection? Could he usually have orgasm? I find the diaries inconclusive." Kepesh has earlier interpreted The Castle as "linked to Kafka's own erotic blockage - a book engaged at every level with not reaching a climax." Indeed, orgasm is as much a metaphor of the quality of revelation in Roth as it is in Mailer and Lawrence, but what is relinquished here is faith in the epistemological validity, never mind the possibility, of what Kepesh calls "oceanic orgasms."
If there are no climaxes in Kafka himself, there are also none in the dream. Kepesh's attempt to disengage Kafka's sexual peculiarities from the whore's memory meets with little success, although her desire to ingratiate herself with the American academic community requires her to give all visitors a peek at "the unseemly thing itself," her aged pudendum. But because Kepesh refuses to touch it, his translator (for the woman speaks only Czech) will not communicate her revelation of Kafka's "big thrill" muttered at the interview's end. Alas, the one moment that would make the visit worthwhile, the one fact that would lift the endless mysteries of literary interpretation once and for all - the knowledge of "what Kafka liked the most" - is lost.
That this central illumination is withheld should come as no surprise, especially since the dream's translator is none other than Herbie Bratasky, the stand-up comic and social director during Kepesh's boyhood at his parents' resort hotel in the Catskills, the Hungarian Royale. Herbie is Kepesh's first hero and his primary role model, and it is with Herbie's slick dress and brazen impersonations that Roth opens the novel. Impersonation, though, is not just an excuse for Herbie to do some jokes - it is the novel's fundamental way of understanding Identity. Kepesh awaits the end of his happiness at the book's close not so much because he is unwilling to resign himself to the necessities of life (though there is certainly a taint of the kvetch in him), but because he senses the imposture required to maintain feelings and convictions - to maintain Desire itself - beyond its imminent vanishing. Hence, Kepesh may continue to profess Desire simply as a means of validating an existence whose integrity is, in numerous ways, constantly subject to assault.
Even Herbie's reliability as an impersonator is subject to collapse once we find out that he now owns an appliance store in Queens. As the seal or emblem at the gate of the narrative, Herbie functions as a kind of Confidence Man manque who presides over the story as a symbol or key which gives the lie to all symbols or keys throughout the book. What we are left with is a world in which all markers or references, like the sign identifying Kafka's tomb in Prague, are written in at least "five tongues." Hence, all interpretation, in life and literature alike, spins endless Talmudic mazes like Kafka's Castle in a vain attempt to formulate a direct and original truth. This, alas, was the giant discovery of Portnoy itself, a novel whose psychology everywhere breaks down into a semiology that rivals and eventually overthrows it.
If the dream of Kafka's whore burlesques the kind of truth Kepesh has set his heart on discovering, his fantasy of teaching a literature course known as Desire 341 searches even further into the ironies of the sexual self-revelation that Kepesh believes to be the path to his redemption. At the very moment of Kepesh's announcement that he will himself be the course's first and primary text - that the semester will be a towering example of candor and self-exposure - he renders himself up to "discourse," skewing that supposedly integral Self for which his entire life has been a search by transforming his existence into the multiple tongues of still another literary document. Indeed, Roth has already provided a formula for this transformation in a humorous revision of Freud's formula, "Where id is, there shall ego be": "Where physical rapture should be," moans Kepesh, "there logical (and illogical) discourse is instead."
As if these ironies are not enough, Roth caps the novel with one of the most embarrassing episodes possible in a world like Kepesh's. The scene comes during his father's Labor Day visit to the mountain cottage, when a proud Abe Kepesh bestows upon his son a monumental present. Opening a gift, of course, is a secular prototype for unsealing a revelation, and a gift or revelation from the father carries with it a special weight of psychological significance. Roth even thickens the occasion by making Abe almost rabbinical as he points to the gift for his son's instruction in a touching parody of pointing at the characters of the Torah in shul. And yet the gift itself - vay iz meer - turns out to be a coin collection that the beaming father refers to as "Shakespeare Medals" - "you just collect one a month," he says - and hopes his son will display them for his students.
Although we may want to avert our eyes from such a scene, Roth himself wants to play on the meaning of "Medals" and "medallions," toying with the words numerous times in the last pages of the novel. One reason for this seems to be technical. As the structuring device at work in all his fiction, what Roth has called a "blocks of consciousness" method of writing narrative can also go by the name that Pound gave to a similar technique in poetry, whereby an apparent sequence is constructed out of a series of brief and self-contained scenes - what Pound called "medallions." That Roth should enact such a technical self-identification by means of an alliance between a nice Jewish father with Ezra Pound is rather like the joke of the party guest in Woody Allen's Sleeper who wears a swastika on his shirt and a tallis around his neck.
More important, however, is that Roth's "medallion" style has grave consequences for whatever stability there seems to be in sequence and linearity. An apparent autobiography, Kepesh's narrative is composed of blocks of discourse which, despite their assumption of chronology, have the potential to be shifted around in relation to one another. After all, such a notion follows directly from the way the entire novel is told under the shadow of Kepesh's later doom. Because we necessarily read Kepesh's future back into his past, understanding what is early by means of what is late, the very text of his biography comes to exist in a fluid state. (This is what structural psychoanalysis calls "deferred action," and its significance here makes me wonder aloud whether Roth has been reading Derrida or Lacan.) That the novel's opening medallion celebrates neither mother (as in Portnoy) nor father (as in My Life as a Man) but the Confidence Man Herbie suggests, too, that even the origin of Kepesh's story is to be neither fixed nor trusted.
In such a centerless universe, it is not despair that is obscene, but hope. Indeed, Roth has furnished us with his own, perhaps inadvertent, definition of obscenity in an interview about Portnoy in 1969. "Portnoy is obscene," he said, "because he wants to be saved." Does Roth mean that grossness is the only path left to Portnoy violent enough to gain him freedom? Or does he mean - in a far more powerful and original definition - that it is Pornoy's very desire for salvation that is obscene?
I choose the latter not only because it explains more in Roth's work but also because it allies him with the deeper strains of his necessary heroes, Kafka and Freud. It is theology, of course, that is the common target here, and it is obscene to Roth for the same reasons that it is obscene to his twin precursors and their brother tummler Nietzsche - because it believes in the existence of redemption, satisfaction, and the real possibility of an Answer. With this Christian heaven in mind, Roth has fashioned Kepesh's curious satisfactions as an act of reprisal in a world consumed by affirmation and its attendant cult of what the novel calls "the wholesome." This is hardly exaggerating the contempt with which the books' remarkable sweetness and humor are intermingled. Taken all together, they combine a profound despair about human life with profound delight in an intellectual play fraught with sexuality. What makes Roth different from all his contemporaries is the degree of tenderness that accompanies his deconstructive rage.
Those who contend that such a polemic is incompatible with a real generosity of feeling would do well to read their Roth again, and to read The Professor of Desire with particular care. There are numerous entrances to Roth's polymorphous fiction, and the healthy reader will explore them all with as much perversity as he can muster.

Originally published in The Village Voice, September 12, 1977

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7/28/10

Steve Winwood Fails His Eye Test

by Perry Meisel

The first time I saw Stevie/Steve Winwood was the day I took my army physical back in the '60s. Judging from the pallor and scrawny frame, it was Windwood who needed the physical. With one foot in heaven and the other somewhere in Georgia, Winwood's persona was precarious enough even during Traffic's glory days. In the intervening years, his work has continued to balance the elfin and the earthy, but it has grown alarmingly diffuse in the process. Despite his increasingly overt commitment to rhythm and blues since the late '60s, Winwood's singing has lost much of its precision and inventiveness. With Traffic now officially disbanded, the release of his new solo LP (Steve Winwood, on Island) represents his lowest ebb in years.
Not that it's offensively bad - rock and roll perennials like Winwood are usually incapable of that. Compared to last year's collaboration with Stomu Yamashta and Michael Shrieve on Go, the new solo disc is a highly wrought production piece in the classic Traffic mold, with its sinewy instrumental parts polished to a sleek, ripply shine. In fact, with Traffic veterans Jim Capaldi, Willie Weeks, and Rebop in evidence throughout the album, this is really a Traffic LP in every way but the billing. Winwood extracts his characteristic textures, colors, and dimensions from a core ensemble whose only new face is session drummer Andy Newmark, who executes Winwood's ensemble conceptions with due understanding of the Traffic signature. Above all, the slow, deep groove is still there, rooted in the snare and bass drum, and packed tight by Winwood's spare but strategic overdubbing on piano, organ, and guitar.
What's lacking, though, is a sharp vision - the melodic and emotional focus that has eluded Winwood since The Low Spark of High-Heeled Boys (perhaps even since John Barleycorn Must Die), and that was regained only briefly when the Muscle Shoals Rhythm Section joined Traffic for awhile in 1973 - 74. By contrast, a subtle kind of tunefulness abounds on the Go album, thanks almost entirely to Yamashta, and it is precisely the absence of such insinuating melodies that makes the grooves and textures of Winwood's new LP ultimately pointless and repetitive - the Traffic structure is still intact, but the guts have gone out of it.
Nor is there much more than a whisper here of Winwood's past exertions on solo guitar or even keyboards. Sure, the organ drenches and funky fills are abundant enough, but they serve tunes so formless that the attention wanders far too often, except on a few enticing refrains ("Midland Maniac" and "Vacant Chair"), which tease the expectations without ever delivering a real chorus or even a memorable phrase. What attempted hooks there are tend to echo past gambits like Blind Faith's "Do What You Like" on "Luck's In" (though played in 6/8 instead of 5/4), or to deploy vaguely commercial shticks like the disco/choral chanting on "Time is Running Out."
That Winwood is frustrated, or drained, or both, is an explicit part of what the album has to say. "Sometimes it's hard to express what you feel," sings Winwood on"Let Me Make Something in Our Life," and the reason seems to be that "it's hard," as he puts it, "to say [see?] the things that are real." Winwood's enduring struggle with Ray Charles's influence may account for his quandary, although it seems rather late in the game for such anxieties to effectively hamper him. But with a history of titles and lyrics that bespeak imprisonment and a violent wish for release, something is obviously bothering him, though it's hard to tell exactly what it is. Now 28, Winwood has reached the end of rock and roll romanticism. What comes next is what we'd all like to know.

Originally published in The Village Voice, July 18, 1977

BEATLEMANIA: You Can't Do That!

by Perry Meisel

Murray the K is shlepping out old pictures of the Beatles as we sit in the plush gloom of Broadway's Winter Garden theatre, where final rehearsals for Beatlemania are under way. Murray is the show's special consultant, and it is his tenuous link to the Beatles that grants any legitimacy to this Broadway simulation. With its multimedia barrage of slides, movies, and graphics designed to evoke the '60s in conjunction with the Beatles' musical development, Beatlemania is an experience comparable to seeing Washington cross the Delaware on You Are There.
Much of the curiosity the show has generated comes from an advertising blitz in the metropolitan area, including a promotional deal with Coca-Cola that offers a reduced ticket price with every six bottlecaps you can collect. So far, the only reviews have come during the show's two-week Boston run - and they were mixed. The New York critics have been circumvented by postponing the official opening and filling commercials with audience testimonials. This, together with an iron unwillingness to expose the eight impostor-Beatles (four starters, four stand-ins) to interviews or unauthorized photographers, seems designed to protect a reported $1 million investment until the show has scored commercially.
On top of all this is the unpredictable course the Beatles' lawyers will take. "Had they been able to stop me," says producer Steve Leber, "they would've." But McCartney's attorney John Eastman says he may still act because, as he puts it, "the guy's ripped-off the Beatles' name." Performance rights to the songs themselves are not, of course, an issue, since they can be bought as a matter of course by anybody who wants to record or perform a Beatle tune. Beatlemania as a whole, however, is "totally unauthorized by the Beatles," says Eastman, who, unlike John Lennon's attorney, Michael Tannen, felt free to express how appalled he was by the entire affair.
Beatlemania is producer Leber's first Broadway fling in a career of rock and roll management that now includes Aerosmith, Ted Nugent, Bobby Womack, and Elliott Murphy. Leber's original idea had been a concert version of the Beatles at the old Liverpool Cavern, but once he hired veteran stage designer Jules Fisher, it developed into a show about what editorial consultant Lynda Obst calls the "dialectical" relation between the events of the '60s and the Beatles' musical development.
There is, however, no real narrative to Beatlemania, and certainly no attempt to flesh out in any detail the personalities of the principals involved, largely because of fears about intruding on the Beatles' actual history. Each of the sound-alikes has been trained to produce the gestures that identify a particular Beatle onstage (Ringo's bobbing head, George's slew-foot dance, Paul's bent-elbow wave). It is an eerie and gruesome entertainment. What you see are walking, talking, singing Beatleoids, frequently veiled by scrim and lights. At times, this ghostliness seems deliberate, as though the production were striving for a Brechtian effect by distancing the audience. But at other times, it strains for the kind of innocence the Beatles never really possessed. The result is to keep you wondering where the intent resides.
Broadway, of course, is simulation par excellence, and the robot quality of the whole gig is what makes Beatlemania workable commercial theatre - neither too hot for straight suburbanites nor too cool for their pubescent offspring. Its manifest markets are all those kids who never saw the Beatles, and all those young parents who saw the '60s from the sidelines. But, in fact, no one ever saw the Beatles - not even those who went to Shea or the Hollywood Bowl. There never were any Beatles: they existed for all of us on records and films. These documents remain more real than any adoration of effigies can ever be.
But we have a fetish for bearing witness, and Beatlemania is playing to it. The producer even goes so far as to deprive his actors of billing, although they are mentioned in the program, together with their birthdates and marital status, in another of the production's attempts to carry the Beatle pretense as far as it will go.
Leber enlisted his sound-alikes through ads in these pages about a year ago. Open auditions yielded four young men with little theatre experience who had never played music with each other before. Joe Pecorino, who portrays John, originally auditioned for the part of Paul. "The manager of my building knew him," says Kenny Laguna, who put the boys through their first paces as Beatle simulators. "He was stripped to himself and his guitar."
Drummer Justin McNeill had been working in Top-40 groups on the Island, while George-impostor Leslie Fradkin (who had some brief success with a group called Daddy Dewdrop) once played in Beatle copy bands. "He knew Harrison's effects cold," says Laguna. "He knew everything."
Onstage, Fradkins gives the distinct impression that he is impersonating the youngest Bee Gee, Robin Gibb. McNeill appears to shrivel behind his drums, and Pecorino looks about as much like Lennon-circa -Yoko as Keith Carradine would in a Lincoln beard and army fatigues. Only Mitch Weissman, the show's first-string Paul, actually resembles a Beatle." He looked like a fat McCartney," says Laguna. Apart from the pounds he had to shed, Weissman was, by all accounts, drenched in Beatle lore. Like the other three, he had been kicking around the music business with only minimal success (his previous gig was as last-minute bassist for Dino Dannelli's group, Bulldog). His voice, though, is uncommonly strong, even if it cracks on high notes in "Yesterday," and he even manages to dredge up some of the Beatles' r&b roots when he rocks out on the vamp to "Got To Get You Into My Life."
But there is no way in the world an astute listener could mistake Weissman for Paul, although the pretense is particularly ironic in view of the real McCartney's emergence as a Beatle sound-alike in his own right. Laguna praises the sound-alikes' musicianship, which is reasonable enough under the grueling circumstances of a gig that requires Weissman and Pecorino to sing 37 songs a day, eight days a week (when you include matinees). This is a far bigger load than either Broadway or rock and roll usually demands; the sheer strain of it may lead the staff to alternate its first-stringers with the stand-ins in an attempt to keep the threat of hoarseness at bay.
But the really hard work came in deciding not just what tunes to play, but how to play them. In rehearsal the musicians listened to Beatle records and argued about what they heard. Says musical director Sandy Yaguda, formerly a member of Jay and the Americans: "Every time you listen, you hear something else."
This may be true for subtleties of counterpoint and lines buried deeply in the mix. Otherwise, the parts are textbook clear, which is exactly what makes a simulation possible in the first place. You couldn't imagine such a project with another band - not from an instrumental point of view - since what distinguishes the Beatles is the way every detail of their sound carries an invariable signature, with no room at all for filling in the dots.
As an exercise in scholarship, the show has produced a reliable interpretation of Beatle scripture, although it is also one that ultimately fails to see into the sources of their power as a rock and roll band. I missed the low, twanging strings on George's guitar and the hard edge on John's; the extra kicks on "We Can Work It Out"; the "Lady Madonna" bass line on "Nowhere Man." Hard work and concentration can reproduce harmonies, inflections, and even personal colorations, like John's nasal timbre. But, as the best white imitators of soulin' can attest, there are ways of copying the masters that evidence some real apprehension of the secrets involved.
The lack of real Beatle punch may also be due to the poor miking of the drums and the insufficient volume of the bass. Such a light mix is necessary on Broadway, where rock and roll's deadly anarchism is strictly forbidden. You simply can't expect the nightshades of "Yer Blues" from a production whose aim is to present the most reassuring profile of the Beatles possible.
But in case anybody should tell you that the Beatles were a top-heavy band, I suggest you listen to Capitol's newly released Hollywood Bowl album. Ringo's mythology has always blinded us to his prowess, which is especially evident in this live performance. As for the peregrinations of McCartney's power-puff bass, Weissman's version is merely a shadow in its overly sustained touch and lumbering walk.
The show's touted hook, though, is not its performance simulation, but the multimedia presentation that accompanies it. Multimedia may be too charged a word for anyone who remembers how devastating the best Fillmore light shows were. Although some of the visuals are striking, for the most part the screens parade a hackneyed series of ban-the-bomb badges, films of Martin Luther King's "dream" speech, and a Times Square news ticker with unlikely headlines like "Hair liberates Broadway." When the sound-alikes hit the big ascending chord on "A Day in the Life," the screen shows a rocket launching, followed by an astronaut doing the Nixon space walk. This is an analogy for "I'd love to turn you on"? This is Broadway-style metaphor-making. It goes for the sign of the thing rather than the thing itself, it represents a representation.
It was on a related theme that Fisher patiently lectured the sound-alikes at rehearsal last week, while they listened, yawned, and smirked at each other like any group of undergraduates in a drama course. Fisher was trying to get them to act their parts with a little more animation, but every time he asked them to think of some private image that might crack them up, the four starters couldn't come up with a thing. Then Fisher asked if they didn't think their present situation was funny enough. "Every time I'm up here," said Weissman, " I look out and I say, it's unbelievable!" Murmurs of assent among the impostors, then giggles, then guffaws. By the time Fisher suggested that people might soon be asking for his autograph, Weissman was rolling on the floor.

Originally published in The Village Voice, June 13, 1977

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Jack Bruce: Odd Man In

by Perry Meisel

About a year after Cream's break-up in 1968 you could go listen to Jack Bruce for two bucks and a bottle of beer at any number of low-prestige clubs around Manhattan. Bruce had just joined Tony Williams's fledgling Lifetime (together with the relatively unknown John McLaughlin, with whom Bruce had worked in pre-Cream days in London) and had thereby removed himself from the ken of an adoring rock audience despite his prowess as a singer and rock bassist without peer. Bruce had almost willfully set himself apart - he had become vanguard crossover, but he had also become a pariah as far as pop mythography was concerned. This image of odd man soon joined the growing eccentricities of his composing to make Bruce an enigma to all but a tiny cult following, even with his return bid for official stardom with West, Bruce, and Laing a few years ago. Despite the fact that 1969's Songs for a Tailor, his first formal solo project, was a minor rock classic, none of his three solo albums are available today in the United States, although his fourth solo album and his first since 1974, How's Tricks, has just been released on RSO.
In certain ways the new album represents Bruce's first substantial break with his previous solo work. The elaborate textures and sonorities of his three earlier discs have been exchanged for the clarities of a minimal quartet, while the songs themselves tend to be straighter and more accessible bag things than you might expect from the brooding composer of Songs for a Tailor, Harmony Row and Out of the Storm. Bruce's new band is composed of relatively unknown British musicians, but they can play everything from jazz-cool funk (How's Tricks) to flat-out rock and roll ("Madhouse," "Baby Jane"), with stops in between at rock ballads ("Without a Word," "Something to Live For") and symphonic montage ("Times"). You could even argue that the bag tunes are evidence that Bruce is joining the mainstream again by becoming a repentant latecomer to the roots revival after too many skirmishes with the avant garde. "Johnny B '77" is a giveaway nod in this direction, and "Madhouse" teases a Chuck Berry hook with at least as much elan as Bob Seger or Graham Parker. A slow blues like "Waiting for the Call" even takes you back to Cream heights like "Politician" or "Sitting on Top of the World," and reminds you how much Cream was really Bruce's band in both its live and its studio incarnations.
Bruce's singing here is also stronger and suppler than ever before, and it can bite your heart out with its tart shivers and exultations. It's no accident that the album's keenest vocals come on "Waiting for the Call," a song of mastery ("I'm captain of the ship") with few precedents in Bruce's scenarios of decay, corruption, and missed opportunities. When Bruce intends conventional kinds of melodies, he writes them with an unsurpassed sense of drama and sings them with more genuine passion and self-curtailment combined than virtually anyone else in rock. Lyricist Pete Brown's obsession with moments of interruption and images of nature going to hell imparts a peculiar feeling of urgency to the natural tautnesss of Bruce's voice, and gives it an existential edge even more pronounced than Parker's and more manicured than Bryan Ferry's.
Despite the novelties and the accessibility, though, the album still bears the characteristic Bruce signature throughout. There are rarely easy hooks in Bruce's music, and even though the new disc is more overtly tuneful than previous ones, what hooks there are get handled with the same kind of restraint that pressure-cooks the singing. Even the Berry channel of "Madhouse" is played only once through whenever it comes around, at least until the rocking vamp at the tune's close allows for an unusual and welcome release. Otherwise, the music consists of uncannily affecting chromatic modulations that rise and fall in spectral sheets of sound, and whose drama depends largely on Bruce's cunning (and for rock, almost unique) use of dynamics. Most of all, Bruce's cross rhythms build stress so that the tautness of his voice becomes the model for his ensemble ideas.
This is exemplary British rock of the kind that Bruce helped to invent - music poised between classical and blues feeling. His cross-rhythms are just one example of the warring prerogatives that set up a nexus of exalting tensions at the center of his music. All this has a conceptual counterpart, too, in the admixture of British folk motifs and American dreams that have characterized Brown's lyrics since Songs for a Tailor and before Anglo-Saxon weirds come and go with themes for imaginary Westerns. Together they map out fields of cultural force that cross and collide like the rhythmic tensions in Bruce's arrangements or like the tension between Scottish ballads and Nina Simone in his voice.

Originally published in The Village Voice, June 6, 1977

Modernism in the Streets

by Perry Meisel

Morris Dickstein's affectionate portrait of the 1960s and its achievements, Gates of Eden: American Culture in the Sixties, is an attempt to dramatize and explore what Dickstein calls the "moral landscape" of the age. In search of the "assumptions and feelings that link the individual to the wider public realities of his time," Dickstein draws on the combined resources of literary criticism, politics, intellectual history, and - in perfect 1960s' fashion - autobiography. What emerges is a remarkable array of chapters that provides less a narrative of what actually happened than a series of sustained encounters with the arts and manners of the day.
Despite the autobiographical accent, however, Dickstein is very much the formal critic whether his subject is rock-and-roll, Pynchon or the New Journalism, although it should be said that his examination of popular culture here is confined almost entirely to music and the press. "Unlike those historians who try to catalogue everything," he says, "I've slighted cultural phenomena for which I felt little affinity." Even the book's personal epilogue has for its theme the anxiety of Lionel Trilling's influence, an influence which accounts for Dickstein's belief that literature should be socially significant and politically aware, but which shows even more that autobiography here really means the life of books and ideas. This makes Dickstein's 1960s a very different time from the one experienced by the swarm of hippies pictured on the book's flyleaf, and makes the book itself a rather different one from earlier chronicles of the period.
Although Dickstein contends that the period was not, as many have suggested, an anti-intellectual one, for those of us who were students then, it was downright unrespectable - and, in a curious way, disrespectful - to be an intellectual. Of course, books themselves weren't so much out of fashion as the act of criticism itself. Analysis was the real villain in the moral struggle between spontaneity and reflection. As a result, Dickstein's emphasis on the literary and the philosophical is a welcome relief. His commitment to ideas goes at least as far back as 1967 and is due in large part to his membership in what he calls the "in between" generation which was already well established in its habits and values compared to those of us who were going through our undergraduate years then in a state of contradiction and uncertainty.
What Dickstein's study shows, however, is that the period was surprisingly unified after all, and that the work of writers like Barthelme and rock stars like Dylan was strikingly similar in theme, style, and intent. Both the hip and the square shared a commitment to what Dickstein calls "the search for authentic selfhood" and "the demystification of authority" and "both art and politics became instruments of personal fulfillment."
The self, in other words, was paramount, even though Dickstein owes his own fascination with the period to its attempt to combine "the search for personal authenticity" with "the quest for social justice." The Utopian urge was contagious in personal life and politics alike, and Dickstein sees the way "the sixties translated the Edenic impulse . . . into political terms" as an historical outgrowth of the same secular theology by which "Hegel and Marx [had] turned Christian eschatology" into "theories of social change." Thus the Zionism that had secularized Dickstein's own roots in Jewish orthodoxy becomes an implicit part of the story, too, and even mirrors the varieties of black meliorism that he examines in his fine chapter on black literature and politics.
Although these arguments are not altogether new in themselves, Gates of Eden is likely to become the official history of the 1960s because it organizes what is already familiar into a sustained critical vision that finds recurrent designs in everything it engages. Like the "primitive satisfactions" of a conventional style of personal life, says Dickstein, "the primitive satisfactions of narrative in fiction, representation in paintings, melody or harmony in music - like clear-cut positions in politics - were highly suspect."
One reason for the suspicions, Dickstein argues, was that objectivity and its conventions came to be recognized as fictions. Here the theme of the self is sounded again, this time in the name of an epistemological revolution that valued subjectivity as the only trustworthy mode of perception. Doubtless the New Journalism was central here, and it put into practice the conviction that the observer was himself a part of the events he witnessed. Thus writers like Richard Goldstein would explain a rock concert by means of his own libidinal fantasies, while Tom Wolfe would deconstruct custom-car racing by drawing on his knowledge of classical painting and aesthetics. Nevertheless, Dickstein finally dismisses Wolfe as "too genteel to let go or to get involved," a judgment that explains why those of us who admired him in the 1960s still wondered whose side he was on. Hence the journalistic Mailer - the Mailer of Armies of the Night and Miami and the Siege of Chicago - becomes the real hero of the decade and of Dickstein's book, even though Trilling was, for Dickstein personally, the more decisive figure.
Despite his withdrawal as the 1960s unfolded, it was Trilling, Dickstein reminds us, who characterized the student movement as "modernism in the streets." Dickstein's assertion that "the adversary ethos of modernism was becoming real" makes me recall - with no little embarrassment - the paper I wrote on Nietzsche's anticipation of the counterculture in The Birth of Tragedy. Whatever the status of such notions today, though, they were basic to the 1960s, and Dickstein is on familiar terrain when he elaborates this link between what was happening among hippies and what had already happened - or seemed to have happened - among our canonical writers.
Rock music, of course, was the cultural focus of the decade, and Dickstein examines some of its central figures in a chapter on Dylan, the Beatles, and the Rolling Stones that argues for rock as a form of modernism too. "Like its forebears in the heyday of modernism and surrealism," says Dickstein, rock "was partly an assault on the audience." Even the lyrics of Dylan and John Lennon, he says, "seemed as surreal" in their own right "as any modernist text." But it is the novel, of course, that most absorbs Dickstein, and he finds in the writers of the 1960s still another version of modernism, "the second coming of modernism in American fiction." This "second coming" was itself divided in two, with the black humorists who emerged in the first part of the decade - Heller, Pynchon, Vonnegut, Southern - expressing by their very paranoia a connection to the social realities that would vanish with the appearance of more properly modernist writers in the late 1960s like Barthelme and Rudolph Wurlitzer, for whom "the sense of disconnection," says Dickstein, "is complete."
Dickstein's assertion that "form can be seen as a structure of perception" is a powerful enough insight to justify his admiration for Vonnegut and Heller alike ("up against a wall," he says, "I'd have to call Catch-22 the best novel of the sixties"), and he uses his formulation to distinguish the one-liner, gag strategy of what he calls "verbal" black humorists like Southern or Bruce Jay Friedman from the "over-articulated form" of "structural" black humorists like Vonnegut, Heller, and Pynchon. Indeed, such a notion of form also lies behind Dickstein's reading of The Crying of Lot 49 as an epistemological tract with conclusions about perception akin to those of the New Journalists.
If form is perception, however, the weary self-consciousness of late 1960s writing like John Barth's stories in Lost in the Funhouse suggests that an arid "escape from personality" threatens to be the backlash "to the fury of self-assertion" among writers earlier in the decade. Dickstein has no sympathy for purely nonreferential writing (hence his careful monitoring of the vicissitudes of Wurlitzer's career), and in "the contemporary wasteland" of experimental fiction from the late 1960s to the present he searches among Donald Barthelme's "fragments" or "miniatures" for the remnants of a connection between "form and feeling." Indeed, writers without such a connection do not even merit the designation "modernist" in Dickstein's aesthetics.
Dickstein understands modernism by way of Trilling's contention in the mid-1950s that the "intense conviction of the existence of the self apart from culture is, as culture well knows, its noblest and most generous achievement." From this point of view, of course, the 1960s' "search for authentic selfhood" really does derive from the liberal imagination's definition of modernism as "the self apart from culture," although to understand the full implications of such a position we have to turn to the excellent account of the 1950s with which Dickstein begins his book.
Social conformity and political repression during the Truman and Eisenhower years, he argues, found its cultural counterpart in the aggressive insularity of the postwar Jewish novel where the psychology of "the isolated self" supplants any real concern with society and, with some irony, allows the Jewish intellectual an easy route to assimilation. Indeed, the radical inwardness of this kind of literature - Dickstein offers a fine reading of Bellow's first novel, Dangling Man, to demonstrate his contention - was "an atonement for Jewish radicalism" in the 1930s. "The concept of alienation," he says, "lost its social content and took on an increasingly metaphysical cast."
But if psychology was a form of repression for writers like Malamud and Bellow, it was instead a form of insurgent liberation for sexual prophets like the Mailer of The White Negro and "The Time of Her Time." Dickstein ascribes this new sensibility to the discovery of a younger, less stoical Freud who becomes "the early prophet of sexual fulfillment." Add to this the discovery of the young, humanist Marx, and the climate was right for Marcuse to attempt his reconciliation of Marx and Freud together in Eros and Civilization.
Ironically, though, such ideological heterodoxy was possible because the 1950s had, as Dickstein makes abundantly clear, announced "the end of ideology." A tool of conformity and repression on the one hand, "the end of ideology" was a tool of liberation on the other, since it allowed revisionists in both Marxism and psychoanalysis to reread their respective canons and produce less deterministic, more humanistic thinkers than orthodox interpretation had previously allowed. Both the young Marx and the early Freud were taken to be prophets of the self rather than society, of the individual rather than the structures - whether psychological or economic - that determined him. Thoroughly Americanized, the self was now under its own control. It was, in short, beyond culture, and would soon claim to be entirely self-generated.
Hence the conviction of the student movement in the 1960s that our perceptions, beliefs, and demands were unique. Despite the American traditions the 1960s revived and extended, few of us knew or felt that an old Left had existed before us, or that our psychedelic music had emerged from now-obvious roots in rhythm and blues. Indeed, the 1960s' version of identity in all spheres of life denied the existence of parentage altogether. His frequent disclaimers notwithstanding, Dickstein himself still seems to believe in the inherent value of the new in a passage like the following: "Whatever the results (and I intend to stress their current limitations), [the techniques of experimental fiction] remain inherently superior to a return to the old stringent molds, which conservative pundits are always ready to reimpose."
Indeed, the 1960s' faith that the new is just as fresh as it seems to be persists throughout many of Dickstein's arguments, and it is difficult to square with the constant pressure of history and tradition that he brings to bear on everything he discusses. As it turns out, our 1960s writers had made their revolt against authority in the name, alas, of new authorities, Joyce, Kafka and Borges in particular; and our musical heroes, whether they were Joplin, Hendrix or Coltrane, were equally indebted to rich traditions even in their departures from them. (Dickstein is clearly aware of what he calls these "vertical" traditions of influence that cut across the horizontal line of history proper, although they do not appear to cause him any anxiety about his insistence, for example, on modernism's newness even in its "second" American incarnation.) Indeed, this same tension was also present in 1960s' notions about selfhood and society, since our belief in the autonomy of the self tended to clash with our conviction that people - as the young Marx had argued - were essentially social creatures.
It is precisely the belief that there can be a self without society that Trilling himself, as Dickstein points out, had to renounce late in his career, and it is this renunciation above all else that lies at the center of the adjustments we have had to make in the 1970s. As long as the self was autonomous - as long as its essence lay outside culture, in nature or transcendence - we could maintain a belief in the immanent Eden of something pristine, primordial, something alinguistic and asocial. Such a belief, however, was in direct contradiction to our Marxist notion of essence, and it was also in contradiction to the authority of modernism as a tradition. "Modernity," says Paul de Man, "invests its trust in the power of the present moment as an origin, but discovers that, in severing itself from the past, it has at the same time severed itself from the present."
Of course, such a belief in the self beyond culture meshed perfectly with Trilling's initial position, and what all this finally suggests is that our adversary or counterculture was no counterculture at all, since it was itself continuous with the theological humanism from which it had devolved. Trilling's ultimate withdrawal from a belief in the self beyond culture only illuminated this continuity, and was emblematic of the way in which the modernist imagination of dislocation and discontinuity was replaced by a new style of imagination - a 1970s' style - located instead in continuity itself.
Dickstein's book is an expression of this 1970s' spirit, too, despite its lingering faith in the ideals of the 1960s. Although Gates of Eden bears witness to the uniqueness of the 1960s, it is finally a testament to the continuity of American intellectual life since World War II. Indeed, much of the book's warmth and excitement derives from the dense texture of reference in which its meanings inhere, and its most affecting moments - Dickstein's portrait of Delmore Schwartz in particular - are often fervent expressions of feeling for the tradition of Jewish-American letters. Dickstein's own models are Trilling, Alfred Kazin and Irving Howe, even though his prose bears some resemblance to Mailer and to rock journalists like Robert Christgau.
Moreover, in spite of Dickstein's overt dislike for post-structuralist criticism, what he refers to as its "intersubjectivity" effectively describes the categories that his own critical language generates not only on the level of style, but also in its use of recurrent figures like "matrix" or "strand" to signify the relations of which cultural discourse is composed. Nostalgia for the garden has been replaced by nostalgia for legacies and traditions instead. Indeed, our world view has been subject to so deep a change since the 1960s that we can now see a field of connections where we once saw only a wasteland.

Originally published in The Nation, April 23, 1977

7/23/10

Cheever's Challenge: Find Freedom

by Perry Meisel

Loneliness has been a staple theme of John Cheever's deceptively modest art over the years, but never before has it been rendered with the combination of toughness and compassion that Cheever brings to it in his new and long-awaited novel, FALCONER (Knopf, $7.95). Now 64, Cheever is beginning to sum up, and what he has to say is sobering and impressive. Gone are the half-humorous tales of the suburbs, and in their place rise the grim walls of Falconer prison, where Cheever's new hero, Ezekiel Farragut, expects to die.
Farragut is a convicted murderer, and Cheever enumerates the details of his life behind bars with the same precision he normally brings to the interpretation of daily life in more familiar surroundings. Instead of a wife who escapes to nude thrills in Greenwich Village, Farragut has a homosexual lover who escapes to his family in the Midwest. Instead of Charlie Mallory's "geometry of love," Farragut has the "contrite geometry" of jailhouse grass-cutting. And instead of swimmer Ned Merrill's belated realization that his house is boarded up and empty, Farragut knows from the start - as Cheever never tires of reminding us - that his own predicament is one of radical dislocation and exile.
Despite Farragut's conviction for murder, though, the reader rarely feels that Cheever's hero belongs in jail or that his outlaw status is particularly real. This, of course, seems to be Cheever's point; imprisonment is our general condition, since all of us, like Farragut, live behind "a barrier of sorrow" between ourselves and the world. Falconer's ultimate import, in other words, is metaphysical, and those readers who expect to find politics here will discover that the book has nothing at all to do with "prison reform." ("Best sellers," writes Cheever with no small irony, "are written about prison reform.") Nor is Cheever's ruling metaphor of confinement as worn-out a conceit as it may seem to be, largely because Cheever interrogates it through so many layers of significance and complication.
Except for a brief inter-chapter that narrates the escape of Farragut's lover, Jody, Cheever tells the story entirely from Farragut's point of view. Although Falconer is Cheever's fourth novel, the single focus is something new in his work. Indeed, Falconer is his first book with only one hero, and it should serve as proof that Cheever is fully capable of sustaining the kind of lengthy, disciplined narrative that many longtime admirers of his stories, among them John Updike, have suggested to be no longer within his powers - or at least within his concerns - as a novelist.
To be sure, such a suspicion may have been justified on the evidence of a career that tends to match every novel with almost two books of short stories, although Cheever's circumspect readers also point to the episodic quality of the novels themselves as indications that he is a pieceworker even there. This may be true of The Wapshot Scandal (1964) - even though Hammer's narrative in Cheever's last novel, Bullet Park (1969), plainly demonstrates his considerable powers in concentrating a fairly lengthy story within the consciousness of a single character.
Hence Cheever's success in Falconer should not be ascribed solely to the new choice of subject. Moreover, despite the prison setting, Farragut is a predictable enough denizen of Cheever's world. Prior to his conviction, he is, like a host of the author's characters before him, a well-to-do commuter (Hudson Division, of course) whose wife averts her face when he goes to kiss her. Farragut, 48, is also a drug addict - not just a pill-popper like Nailles in Bullet Park, but a real, honest-to-God heroin freak. What makes him unique among Cheever's characters, though, is his peculiar situation in the eyes of the law. When the book begins, we find him entering the main gates of Falconer prison. When the story closes, we find him being carried out through a side entrance, wrapped for escape in another man's shroud.
It is a neat allegory, and, besides its Christian reveberations of fall, trial, and redemption, it packs a keen psychological drama. Farragut's crime is fratricide, and he kills his older brother, Eben, in an attempt to rescind the cruel and shocking news that Eben imparts to him in the course of a violent quarrel: "He had an abortionist come out to the house. Your own father wanted you to be killed. . . . He loved me, but wanted you to be killed."
From the novel's overtly Christian point of view Farragut wins his escape through deeds. (This comes at the end of the book, well after Jody has himself escaped - as part of a visiting bishop's entourage.) It is Farragut's simple and instinctive kindness toward the oldest and loneliest of his blockmates, Chicken, that is directly responsible for his redemption. When Chicken takes ill, Farragut washes the old man's wrinkled and tatooed body and brings him into his own cell, where he cradles him in his arms until he expires. Once Chicken is dead, it dawns on Farragut to exchange places with him in the burial sack, at which point the shroud of death is instantly transformed into a womb of rebirth.
But if Farragut's release leaves Cheever with a completed novel, it leaves Farragut himself with nowhere to go - his wife has divorced him and his brother, of course, is dead. There are, alas, no "fields of paradise on the other side of the wall," as Farragut once believed. This, however, is precisely what he has learned by the book's close. It is the exact price of his ransom to realize that life is to be valued not for its alleged freedom, but for the confinements it places upon us. Hence Farragut is finally able to throw off the "torpor" that is both the consequence and the cause of the various addictions, crimes, and irresponsibilities of his past life. Responsibility alone makes up the happy confinements known as freedom and love.
Unfortunately, all this smacks of Milton's God, although I am pleased to say that Cheever has written a book that is after all much bigger than its theology. To be sure, Cheever's Christianity is thoroughly secular, and its absolute dismissal of a "paradise" anywhere in sight should also make it clear that his famous nostalgia for nature, youth, and the past is little more than a gentle fiction of its own at this point in his career (if, indeed, it was ever really more than that). Nor should one neglect the related fact that Cheever's humanism here joins Bellow's in maintaining a vigilant stance against the Wastelanders, whose logic, however inadvertently, requires some kind of paradise both before and after the historical aberration known as the modern age.
Cheever, however, is by no means locked into dangerous myths of pure feeling like those that accompany Bellow's brand of humanism, and it is the peculiar virtue of all his work that a tough-minded "cybernetics" - to use the vocabulary of the Wapshot novels - always accompanies and balances whatever excesses his piety for "man" might produce. Moreover, this second current in Cheever's work is capable of adducing the same conclusions about life that are to be found in his humanism, but it has the advantage of removing naive elements of freedom and recognition by focusing on forces in existence far more determining than the conscious plight of a single individual like Farragut.
Farragut's attempt to maintain his identity in prison allows Cheever to uncover structures of the self long hidden by the easy assumptions we make about selfhood in normal society. Farragut depends on his memories and his dreams to keep his personality intact while he languishes in Cellblock F. But these threads of identity are far less secure than he expects them to be. When they snap, Farragut is faced with what Cheever calls "the absolute experience of alienation": "he did not know who or where he was, that the uses of the toilet he faced were completely mysterious, and that he could not understand a word of the book he held in his hands. He did not know himself. He did not know his own language."
It is not by accident that Farragut's "absolute alienation" is figured as his alienation from language. Memory and dreams have always been cast as a set of linguistic structures in Cheever's work (indeed, they provide the organizing metaphors for both Wapshot novels), and their "controlled and repeated designs" constitute a map of the self in which - or on which - Farragut tries constantly to locate himself. To the extent that prison robs him of his ability to read the map's coordinates, Farragut is in exile from his own being. Thus his gradual adaptation to the grayness and absence of life in jail rests largely on his ability to read in whatever form he can what Cheever calls the "contour" and the "geometry" of life as we know it. "The contrite geometry of grass-cutting pleased him. To cut the grass one followed the contour of the land. To study the contour of the land . . . was to study and read the contour of the neighborhood, the county, the state, the continent, and to study and read the contour of the planet was to study and read the nature of its winds as his old father had done, sailing catboats and kites. Some oneness was involved, some contentment."
Nor is Farragut at all unique in having his selfhood cast by Cheever as a geometrical set of signifying "designs." Although Farragut feels that his jeopardized birth sets him apart from his brother, who, unlike himself, has enjoyed a full and natural entrance into the world, it is nonetheless true that both children "had learned to crawl on the hieroglyphs woven into the Turkey rugs" of their childhood. That is to say, childhood itself seems to involve some common grounding, not in nature or biology, but in the "designs" - the hieroglyphs or texts - that constitute even the earliest experiences of the infant and that persist forever as a "tracery" in the rhetoric of memory.
Sexuality is part of the "design," too - Farragut knows, for example, that he is horny because the "honeycomb" of his "braincells" "interprets" his otherwise "speechless genitals." Cheever even tatooes Chicken's body from head to foot so as to make the flesh itself a cluster of written inscriptions or "tracery." And if this appears to be too radical a reading of Cheever's novel, one has only to turn to Cheever's first description of Farragut's threatened abortion, which is made specifically and emphatically in terms of writing and texts: "his father, having written Farragut's name with his cock, had tried to erase the writing."
Cheever's rhetoric, in other words, builds up a graphic representation of identity as a set of texts or designs in which the subject is located by coordinates or positions as though in a network or on a map. Like Cheever's secular Christianity, these "cybernetic" structures maintain an inevitable separation between man and some projected "paradise" in nature or in pure feeling. They also maintain a separation between what we know and what we are that does not square entirely with the fact of Farragut's recognition of his human responsibilities.
As it turns out, the entire structure of Farragut's character may be erected on a scandalous lie - Farragut, after all, knows of his threatened abortion only through the words of his brother. Hence all his attempts at self-location proceed according to determinations or plottings that may or may not be historically true, but which function as his true history nonetheless. Where that leaves Farragut as a responsible agent is plainly open to question.
In any case, Cheever's obsession with inscriptions, emblems, hieroglyphs, and designs tends to subvert Falconer's basic premises. The novel interrogates the concept of imprisonment and finds the notion more problematic than we think it is. Farragut's life behind bars is precisely life without bars - life without the bars, grids, structures, and designs that provide us with our sense of location. From this point of view, imprisonment makes no sense at all since, as a notion, it depends on the difference between inside and outside, between what is confined and what is free; a difference that the book calls directly into question.
Cheever is rather literal about this: "At Falconer the walls and the bars had sometimes seemed to vanish, leaving [Farragut] with a nothingness that would be worse." In Cheever's view, imprisonment is in fact a snugness, and the sad but fraternal life of the inmates in Cellblock F presents in bald form the kind of security that a character like Nailles in Bullet Park finds in the confinement of his joyous monogamy. It is also from this snugness that Farragut derives whatever feeling he may have for Chicken - which allows him to take upon himself the responsibility that eventually wins his escape.
At this point the novel's two currents - one humanist, one cybernetic - meet to generate the complexities of Falconer as a whole. Cheever's two worlds in the narrative are not, after all, in conflict but in harmony, and it is a measure of his achievement to have built a text sturdy enough - like the prison itself - to reconcile the rival currents of much contemporary fiction and criticism - humanist and affective on the one hand, structural and rhetorical on the other. Moreover, if we need a measure of how absurd our ethnic categories for fiction really are, we have one here. It is Bellow who resembles Cheever as a humanist far more that the goyische Pynchon does, and it is Pynchon who resembles Cheever in his non-Christian or cybernetic profile perhaps more than any writer except Philip Roth.
Finally, if Falconer is composed of converging texts - one humanist, one cybernetic - there is a correlative for it, too - and that is the prison itself. (The idea of duplication is everywhere - in homosexuality, in Farragut's prison job of typing dittos, in his twinlike resemblance to his brother.) With its inexhaustible series of cells and corridors and with the alphabetical array of its compartments (Cellblocks A, B, C. . . . F), the prison, too, is a lexical grid much like the novel's own network of language. Nor is this merely implicit in Cheever's book. "F stands for fucks, freaks, fools, fruits, first-timers, fatasses like me, phantoms, funnies, fanatics, feebies, fences, and farts," says Tiny, Farragut's turnkey; and the name "Falconer" itself - another derivation of the F, like Farragut's own name - is presented in all its "declensions" (names, dates, history, symbols) inscribed above the "escutcheon" nailed to the prison's gate.
The real testament to Cheever's mastery of language, though, lies in the abundance of things his art will continue to signify well after its time. C, after all, stands for Cheever, Christianity, cybernetics, Chicken, convict, confinement, copy.

Originally published in The Village Voice, March 14, 1977

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